This paper evaluates issue linkage in cooperative transboundary water sharing, which concerns the discounted trade of hydroelectric power as a compensation for greater transboundary water flow to the hydropower generating plant. In a theoretical, analytical framework we show how such issue linkage of water and energy can enhance the scope of cooperation between the upstream-downstream countries. Under conditions of limited scope of cooperation, issue linkage has often been mentioned as a possible cooperative strategy to overcome international upstreamdownstream water sharing and other unidirectional externality problems. Issue linkage is more likely to sustain cooperation than side-payments, as it offers additional options to sanction noncooperative behavior.
This paper analyzes transboundary water sharing between Burkina Faso and Ghana in the Volta Basin, West Africa, which exhibit a distinct upstream -downstream constellation; and explores the influence of an issue linkage of water and energy. In this case, the "issue linkage to water sharing" concerns the trade of hydroelectric power generated in Ghana to Burkina Faso. Ghana can therein offer trade concessions as an incentive for Burkina Faso to cooperate on water sharing issue. Traditionally, one might expect water sharing and trade to be separate issues that need separate negotiation. However, given the water-energy-nexus, the issue linkage in this case becomes likely, where water shared by Burkina Faso would improve the production of hydropower, which in parts can be sold to Burkina Faso at discounted rates. The paper formalizes such a linkage in a game theoretical framework and examines the benefits and sustainability of water-sharing agreements. The paper applies a static Stackelberg leader follower game to evaluate the scope of bilateral cooperation in the management of water resources in the Volta River Basin. First, we model the allocation of water resource between Ghana and Burkina Faso in a non-cooperative framework where the upstream country, Burkina Faso, chooses how much water to divert from the River to maximize its own welfare. The downstream country Ghana acts as a "follower", whose water availability depends on the flow of water diverted by Burkina Faso. Second, we formulate a Stackelberg leader-follower game in a setting where Ghana offers Burkina Faso a discounted price for energy in exchange for guaranteed transboundary water flow from Burkina Faso to Ghana. Finally, the outcomes of the cooperative and the non-cooperative cases are compared, and the conditions for cooperation are explored.
The results of the paper show that the interdependency of countries can lead to efficient and effective solutions regarding water sharing. In the cooperation phase, Ghana will get an opportunity to increase its water consumption for agriculture which remains restricted presently, while Burkina Faso benefits from discounted hydropower as a compensation for restricting its water consumption. In such a case, the cooperation is mutually beneficial and stable. However, such kind of interdependency may not be sustaining in the very long run, i.e. when population increase induces Burkina Faso to increase its water consumption and destabilizes the cooperation based on water-energy issue linkage.
